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ABSTRACT 
 
John D. Gallemore: Does Bank Opacity Enable Regulatory Forbearance? 
(Under the direction of Edward L. Maydew) 
 
Regulators are charged with closing troubled banks, but can instead practice forbearance 
by allowing these troubled banks to continue operating. This paper examines whether bank 
opacity affects regulators’ ability to practice forbearance. Opacity inhibits non-regulator 
outsiders from accurately assessing bank risk, potentially allowing regulators to forgo 
intervention. Employing a sample of U.S. commercial banks during the recent crisis, I find that 
bank opacity is positively associated with a new measure of forbearance and negatively 
associated with the probability of failing during the crisis. Cross-sectional results are consistent 
with opacity being more important for forbearance when (1) regulators’ incentives are stronger 
(as measured by bank connectedness) and (2) outsiders’ incentives to monitor are stronger (as 
measured by the proportion of deposits that are uninsured). These results suggest that opacity 
enables regulators to forbear on connected banks to prevent financial sector contagion and to 
disguise forbearance from uninsured creditors. This study contributes to the literature on the role 
of accounting in forbearance by being the first to show the effect of bank-level opacity on the 
regulator’s decision to intervene or forbear. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Bank regulators are responsible for monitoring the financial sector, which includes 
closing troubled banks. However, regulators do not always choose to close an unsound bank, and 
instead practice forbearance by allowing the bank to continue operating.
1
 The desire to practice 
forbearance can stem from political pressure (Mishkin 2000; Brown and Dinç 2005), potential 
loss of reputation (Boot and Thakor 1993; Mishkin 2000), or concerns about the health of the 
financial sector (Brown and Dinç 2011; Morrison and White 2013). Forbearance allows the 
troubled bank to potentially escalate risk-taking or continue its existing risky behavior, which 
can increase the ultimate cost of resolving the bank (Santomero and Hoffman 1998). However, 
forbearance can be a prudent regulatory choice if the bank recovers without costly intervention 
(Santomero and Hoffman 1998) or if closing the troubled bank would spread problems to or 
undermine confidence in healthy institutions (Allen and Gale 2000; Morrison and White 2013). 
While academics have made progress in understanding the incentives to practice forbearance, 
research on regulators’ ability to forbear is scarce. Specifically, there is little empirical evidence 
about which bank-level factors enable regulators to apply forbearance.  
In this study, I examine whether bank opacity affects regulators’ ability to practice 
forbearance. I define bank opacity as the extent to which financial accounting information 
creates uncertainty about intrinsic value (Bushman and Williams 2013). Accounting information 
                                                 
1
 In this study, I define regulatory forbearance as the decision not to close a troubled bank. This definition is 
consistent with many prior studies of regulatory forbearance (Boot and Thakor 1993; Santomero and Hoffman 1998; 
Brown and Dinç 2011; Morrison and White 2013). 
2 
plays an important role in the monitoring of banks by non-regulator outsiders (Bushman and 
Williams 2012). If a bank’s weakness is evident to non-regulator outsiders (such as depositors 
and the public) through accounting information, regulators could feel pressured to close the bank 
(Rochet 2004, 2005). On the other hand, a regulator may successfully forbear on a troubled bank 
if it hides its problems and risk from outsiders through opacity (Bushman and Landsman 2010). 
I propose and test several hypotheses. First, I investigate whether bank opacity is 
associated with regulatory forbearance. Second, I examine when opacity is more important for 
forbearance. Allen and Gale (2000) show that when banks are connected via interbank lending, 
liquidity shocks (such as the failure of one bank) can cause system-wide contagion. Therefore, 
regulatory forbearance can prevent problems at a connected bank from spreading through the 
financial sector. If the ability to practice forbearance is more important when the incentives to 
practice forbearance are stronger, then I expect that the effect of opacity on forbearance will be 
greater for connected banks. Next, I test whether the effect of opacity on forbearance is different 
for banks with a greater proportion of deposits that are uninsured.
2
 Compared to insured 
depositors, uninsured depositors have stronger incentives to monitor banks since a troubled bank 
can engage in risk shifting in hopes of achieving solvency.
3
 Therefore, if opacity enables 
forbearance by inhibiting monitoring, then I expect that the effect of opacity on forbearance will 
be stronger for banks with a higher proportion of deposits that are uninsured. 
To examine the effect of opacity on forbearance, I exploit variation in loan loss 
provisioning across banks. Loan loss provisioning is arguably the most important accounting 
choice for banks, as it affects the volatility and cyclicality of earnings as well as the 
                                                 
2
 I examine uninsured depositors since they are generally the largest non-insured creditor in U.S. commercial banks. 
 
3
 On the other hand, insured depositors’ payoffs are completely fixed and thus are unaffected by the closure or 
continued operation of a troubled bank. 
3 
informational characteristics of the financial statements relating to loan portfolio risk (Bushman 
and Williams 2012). Consistent with prior research, I use the extent to which a bank delays 
recognizing future loan portfolio deteriorations when determining its loan loss provision as a 
measure of opacity (Bushman and Williams 2012, 2013). Using international data, Bushman and 
Williams (2012) show that delayed expected loan loss recognition (DELR) is associated with 
dampened disciplinary pressure on risk-taking, consistent with DELR reducing bank 
transparency and inhibiting monitoring by uninsured creditors and other outsiders. Vyas (2011) 
finds that outsiders discover information about the loss exposure of risky assets slower for firms 
with less timely loan loss provisions and other write-downs during the recent crisis. Banks that 
under-provisioned for loan losses during the crisis likely also made other opacity-increasing 
accounting choices, such as failing to write down assets and using discretion in the classification 
of assets on the balance sheet (Huizinga and Laeven 2012). Therefore, banks that delay the 
recognition of expected loan losses are likely opaque along multiple dimensions, and the reduced 
ability of non-regulator outsiders to monitor these banks can enable regulatory forbearance. 
Identifying cases of regulatory forbearance is challenging. Regulators generally only 
announce when a financial institution is closed; they do not publicize that they have decided to 
forbear on an insolvent bank. Thus, the regulator’s private decision to practice forbearance is not 
observable. Prior empirical studies examine bank failures and interpret a negative correlation 
between the probability of failing and the variable of interest as evidence of forbearance (Brown 
and Dinç 2011). However, this approach does not capture the differing intensities with which 
regulators can apply forbearance. In this study, I create a measure that captures the amount of 
forbearance that regulators apply to an individual bank, in addition to examining bank failures. 
4 
 To test my hypotheses, I examine a sample of approximately 7,000 U.S. commercial 
banks during the recent financial crisis. This setting has several desirable features for 
investigating the effect of opacity on regulatory forbearance. First, forbearance was likely to 
have been practiced by U.S. regulators during the crisis (Brown and Dinç 2011). Second, there 
were a number of bank failures during the crisis, providing variation to empirically examine 
forbearance.
4
 Third, the sample is predominantly composed of small private commercial banks 
with simple business models that focus on lending, making it likely that regulators were 
informed about banks’ true health and risk. Fourth, the primary non-regulator stakeholders in 
these banks are unsophisticated depositors such as local individuals and small businesses, who 
may not have been able to unravel opacity. Finally, U.S. commercial banks face a relatively 
homogeneous regulatory and economic environment, allowing me to more easily isolate the 
effect of opacity on forbearance.
5
 
 I find that opaque banks experienced greater forbearance and were less likely to fail 
during the crisis. The positive association between opacity and forbearance is stronger within 
connected banks and banks that have a greater proportion of deposits that are uninsured. Finally, 
I conduct a number of tests intended to further identify a causal link between opacity and 
forbearance. Specifically, I measure opacity before the financial crisis as well as in first 
differences during the crisis, use fixed effects regression, employ instrumental variables to 
mitigate simultaneity concerns, and examine an alternative measure of bank-level opacity. The 
                                                 
4
 This setting allows me to examine a much larger sample of bank failures than past studies of regulatory 
forbearance. For example, Brown and Dinç (2011) examine 40 bank failures. In contrast, my sample consists of 258 
bank failures from 2007 to 2010. 
 
5
 Additionally, data availability permits me to control for factors likely to be important in determining bank failures, 
such as the nonperforming loans ratio, that other studies of forbearance such as Brown and Dinç (2011) were unable 
to include. 
5 
main inferences are robust to these different specifications. Overall, the results are consistent 
with bank-level opacity enabling forbearance. 
This study has implications for the concurrent debate regarding bank transparency. A 
lack of transparency has often been cited as contributing heavily to the recent financial crisis, and 
many have argued that the financial sector cannot function properly without a sufficient amount 
of disclosure (Acharya et al. 2009; Dudley 2009). However, others have suggested that bank 
transparency is not always desirable (Gorton 2013; Dang et al. 2013). Holmstrom (2012) and 
Dang et al. (2012) argue that that opacity can facilitate short-term liquidity. Morrison and White 
(2013) show that the public disclosure (through failure) of problems at one bank can spread 
uncertainty to otherwise healthy banks supervised by the same regulator. Siritto (2013) 
demonstrates that improving transparency can lead to a greater probability of bank runs. My 
results add to this debate by showing that opacity appears to be an important factor in 
forbearance by regulators. If it is the case that some forbearance allows troubled banks to recover 
without costly intervention and inhibits the spread of uncertainty to connected but otherwise 
healthy banks, then these results are consistent with a social benefit from opacity. 
In addition to informing the policy debate regarding bank transparency, this study 
contributes to the accounting and banking literatures. First, my study extends recent research 
examining bank accounting and regulatory forbearance (Skinner 2008; Huizinga and Laeven 
2012). Prior studies in this area interpreted changes in bank accounting as being consistent with 
regulators desiring opacity for forbearance purposes. This study is the first to examine the 
association between bank-level opacity and the regulators’ choice to intervene or forbear. My 
results also have implications for the recent literature examining the economic effects of bank 
transparency, in particular loan loss provisioning behavior (Beatty and Liao 2011; Bushman and 
6 
Williams 2012, 2013). While most studies in this area document benefits of timely expected loan 
loss recognition, my study suggests that banks that delay recognizing expected loan losses are 
less likely to experience regulatory intervention. Furthermore, I examine the effect of financial 
accounting on regulatory choices, rather than on the bank decisions such as lending and risk-
taking. Finally, my study contributes to the literature on regulatory forbearance. This literature 
primarily focuses on regulators’ incentives to practice forbearance. In contrast, I examine a bank-
level factor, opacity, which affects the regulators’ ability to successfully practice forbearance. 
 The paper continues as follows. Section 2 describes institutional features of my setting 
and the prior research on forbearance, and explains how opacity can affect forbearance. Section 3 
describes the research design and sample employed in the empirical analyses. Results and 
robustness analyses are presented in section 4, and section 5 concludes the study. 
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CHAPTER 2: INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
In section 2.1, I provide an overview of bank supervision in the United States, including 
the bank closure process. Section 2.2 describes prior research on the incentives to engage in 
regulatory forbearance. Section 2.3 explains how opacity can potentially affect regulators’ ability 
to practice forbearance on individual banks. 
2.1 Bank Supervision and Bank Closures in the United States 
The purpose of bank supervision is to maintain the stability of both the individual bank 
and the overall financial sector (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 2003; Federal Reserve 
2005).
6
 During the recent financial crisis, there were four national bank supervisors in the United 
States: the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Federal Reserve, the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS).
7
 Each bank 
regulator has jurisdiction over a different subset of banks. For example, the FDIC has special 
supervisory authority over banks with insured deposits (Federal Reserve 2005). In some cases, 
supervisory duties are shared with another national regulator as well as with state supervisors. 
                                                 
6
 For example, the FDIC states that its primary mission is to “maintain stability and public confidence in the United 
States financial system” and that it accomplishes this through, among other functions, the “supervision and 
regulation of banks and thrifts.” 
 
7
 The OTS was merged into the OCC in 2011. The OTS supervised savings banks and savings and loans 
associations, which are not included in my sample unless they filed call reports. 
 
8 
Supervision of U.S. banks is accomplished using both on-site examinations and off-site 
monitoring (Federal Reserve 2005).
8
 Off-site monitoring is primarily accomplished through the 
analysis of financial data reported directly to the appropriate regulator by the financial 
institution. Banks are required to file call reports each quarter, which contain detailed 
information on the balance sheet and recent performance. Regulators focus additional attention 
on problem institutions identified from the analysis of data collected from on-site inspections and 
call reports (Federal Reserve 2005). Thus, bank supervision is based partially on data that is 
private to the regulator and unobservable to depositors and the public. 
Since insolvent banks can continue to operate by issuing new deposits to fund old 
liabilities, bank regulators are charged with closing these banks in a timely manner (Brown and 
Dinç 2011). The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) 
requires U.S. bank regulators to take prompt corrective action (PCA) to resolve the problems of 
financial institutions. The purpose of PCA is to limit regulators’ ability to delay intervention. 
However, U.S. regulators still have substantial flexibility as to when to close a troubled financial 
institution (Edwards 2011). Banks are generally deemed to be in “unsafe or unsound” condition, 
and thus eligible to be closed by regulators, if their tier 1 capital ratio is less than two percent. 
However, a regulator can allow a bank with a tier 1 ratio below two percent to continue operating 
if the bank has entered into a written agreement with the regulator detailing how the bank will 
remedy its capital situation.
9
 Furthermore, regulators can influence bank accounting, allowing 
                                                 
8
 Bank inspections are thorough, and the time spent on them can extend to over two months in addition to on-site 
work for poorly rated institutions (Office of Inspector General 2012). These inspections, in combination with data 
submitted directly to the regulator by the bank, are used by regulators to generate CAMELS ratings which classify 
banks according to risk exposure. Banks’ CAMELS ratings are not publicly disclosed by regulators, and constitute 
part of their private information set. 
 
9
 Additionally, regulators can also choose to close a bank that has a tier 1 ratio above two percent if they deem the 
bank to be operating in an “unsafe and unsound manner.” 
9 
them to prevent banks from crossing thresholds that would require regulatory intervention and 
inhibiting market discipline of regulatory forbearance (Bushman and Landsman 2010). 
The FDIC is the U.S. regulator responsible for the resolution of failed banks (Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation 2003). When a regulator decides to close a bank, it notifies the 
FDIC which devises a plan for resolving the bank and sends personnel to maintain the bank’s 
day-to-day operations. Eventually, the FDIC either arranges for a healthier bank to acquire the 
troubled bank, or it liquidates the bank, paying off all insured deposits and some portion of the 
uninsured deposits (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 2003).
10
 
2.2 Regulatory forbearance 
Although regulators are tasked with the timely resolution of insolvent financial 
institutions, prior research has documented various reasons why regulators may instead practice 
forbearance by allowing weak banks to continue operating. First, forbearance is often discussed 
as a practical element of the lowest cost solution for dealing with troubled banks. Intervention is 
costly, and regulators can forbear on a troubled bank in order to allow the bank time to recover 
without having to incur these costs (Santomero and Hoffman 1998; Brown and Dinç 2011). For 
example, the manpower necessary to close a bank constitutes a significant cost to regulators. 
When the FDIC decides to close a bank, it must send a team of employees to assume the bank’s 
day-to-day operations. Even for small banks, this cost can be quite large: for example, in 2009, 
the FDIC sent a team of approximately 80 agents to take over the Bank of Clark County, which 
had only 100 employees (Joffe-Walt 2009). Direct costs can also include bankruptcy costs and 
lower asset values due to fire sales (Brinkmann et al. 1996). Many of these direct costs are likely 
                                                 
10
 For a complete overview of the bank resolution process, see the FDIC resolution handbook: 
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/reshandbook/ch2procs.pdf 
10 
heightened during crisis periods (Santomero and Hoffman 1998).
11
 However, forbearance can 
also increase the ultimate cost of resolving the bank, since it creates a moral hazard for bank 
management (Santomero and Hoffman 1998). Managers at a troubled bank have incentives to 
increase risk-taking since they do not share in losses but benefit from achieving solvency. The 
high risk strategies will likely lead to higher closure costs for the regulator if the bank fails. 
Second, some research suggests that forbearance can be a prudent regulatory policy from 
an overall welfare perspective. The closure of a troubled bank can lead to concerns about the 
soundness of connected institutions. Allen and Gale (2000) show that an unanticipated liquidity 
shock (such as the failure of a bank) can cause system-wide contagion, as problems spread from 
the failed bank to other banks connected through intra-bank lending and borrowing. In the model 
put forth by Diamond and Rajan (2005), bank failures can be contagious because they shrink the 
available pool of liquidity, creating or exacerbating aggregate liquidity shortages. Morrison and 
White (2013) demonstrate that a similar effect can occur when banks are connected by regulator, 
as the failure of one institution can lead outsiders to lose confidence in other banks supervised by 
the same regulator. In both cases, regulators can opt to forbear on troubled banks to prevent the 
liquidity shock or uncertainty from spreading to the rest of the financial sector. Concerns about 
the general state of the banking sector can also lead regulators to practice forbearance. 
Regulators may not be able, nor willing, to close the entire banking sector during a financial 
crisis (Santomero and Hoffman 1998). Forbearance could therefore be necessary if a large 
number of banks are insolvent. Brown and Dinç (2011) find that regulators are more likely to 
practice forbearance during crisis periods, which they refer to as the Too-Many-to-Fail effect. 
Furthermore, regulators may prefer forbearance if the banking sector’s problems begin to 
                                                 
11
 For example, asset values are more likely to be depressed during a crisis period, meaning that fire sales will be 
more costly. 
11 
threaten the viability of the deposit insurance fund. For example, in the United States, the FDIC 
and the FSLIC have been known to practice forbearance in response to concerns about deposit 
insurance (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 1997; Santomero and Hoffman 1998).
12
  
Finally, forbearance may be a result of the principal-agent problem, where regulators (the 
agent) do not have the same incentives as taxpayers (the principal). For example, the closure of a 
bank could signal to depositors and the public that the regulator is of low quality (Boot and 
Thakor 1993). A failed bank could lead to the regulator being blamed for poor performance, and 
thus by pursuing forbearance regulators can hope the situation will improve to escape culpability 
(Kane 1989; Mishkin 2000). Regulators also face pressure from politicians, who strongly 
influence their careers and prefer the appearance of a strong banking sector (Kane 1989; Mishkin 
2000; Brown and Dinç 2005). These self-interested concerns will lead the regulator to forgo 
closing troubled banks, even if bank closure was desirable from the perspective of the taxpayers. 
 While prior research has established that regulators sometimes practice forbearance, non-
regulator bank stakeholders such as depositors have different incentives.
13
 Given the debt-like 
nature of their payoffs, depositors likely prefer timely intervention into troubled banks.
14
 
Depositors place funds in a bank expecting to have the ability to withdraw them whenever they 
choose (Santomero and Hoffman 1998). If a bank exhibits weakness, depositors will become 
                                                 
12
 Alternatively, the FDIC may have had stronger incentives not to forbear in order to limit losses to the deposit 
insurance fund during the recent crisis. 
 
13
 I use the terms “non-regulator stakeholders” and “outside stakeholders” to refer to non-equity holders such as 
depositors and the general public. Note that while I generally focus on depositors, the general public may also be 
concerned about bank insolvency since bank weakness can spread throughout the financial sector. Thus, the general 
public may desire early regulatory intervention. For the purposes of this classification, I group equity stakeholders 
along with management, since in the small, primarily private banks I examine in this study, they likely are the same. 
 
14
 One exception is if the bank’s condition is so poor that uninsured depositors are not likely to receive any funds 
upon the bank’s liquidation. In this case, the incentives of uninsured depositors could align with bank 
management/owners if for some reason they could not liquidate their funds. This is unlikely in my setting, as 
uninsured depositors eventually receive 70 to 80 percent of their funds upon the sale of the bank’s assets (Banjo 
2008). 
12 
concerned about their ability to withdraw funds. In the extreme, this concern about the bank’s 
viability can cause a run on the bank’s deposits (Diamond and Dybvig 1983). While this concern 
is stronger for uninsured depositors who stand to lose their funds if the bank continues to shed 
value, recent research suggests that even insured depositors may run from a troubled bank 
(Davenport and McDill 2006; Iyer and Puri 2012; Iyer et al. 2013). Furthermore, troubled banks 
have incentives to increase risk-taking, shifting value from depositors to equity holders 
(Santomero and Hoffman 1998). Timely regulatory intervention into a troubled bank can prevent 
further erosion of enterprise value and minimize the loss of depositor funds. 
2.3 Bank opacity and regulatory forbearance 
While academics have examined the incentives to engage in forbearance, little attention 
has been paid to the ability to practice forbearance. One potential bank-level factor that can 
influence the regulators’ ability to practice forbearance is the opacity of the bank’s information 
environment. The third pillar of Basel II discusses market discipline, specifically the role non-
regulator bank outsiders play in the supervision of financial institutions. Using the Basel II 
framework, Rochet (2004) and Decamps et al. (2004) analytically show that market discipline 
can limit forbearance. If non-regulator stakeholders act as if the bank is troubled (e.g., if 
depositors withdraw funds), regulators can be forced to intervene into the bank as forbearance 
becomes too costly for the regulator and/or government. Therefore, a regulator’s ability to 
engage in forbearance is a function of monitoring by non-regulator stakeholders (Rochet 2005). 
Opacity is an important factor that affects outsiders’ ability to monitor financial 
institutions (Bushman and Williams 2012). Opacity can enable forbearance by disguising the 
bank’s actual condition, making it difficult for non-regulator stakeholders to assess the bank’s 
intrinsic value and pressure regulators for timely intervention (Bushman and Landsman 2010). 
13 
Prior research indicates that while depositors monitor banks (Peria and Schmukler 2001; Iyer et 
al. 2013), they can be fooled by bank opacity. Iyer et al. (2013) use micro-level depositor data 
for a bank in India to examine whether depositors monitor banks.
15
 They show that after a 
regulatory audit found the bank to be insolvent, depositors began to withdraw funds even though 
the results of the audit were not publicized, which they interpret as evidence of monitoring by 
depositors. The audit discovered that the bank’s financial statements for the prior two years did 
not reflect the true extent of the bank’s problems. Noting that there was no run on deposits prior 
to the regulatory audit, the authors conclude that while depositors monitored the bank (evidenced 
by their knowledge of the supposedly private regulator audit), they were unable to deduce the 
bank’s problems from its previously released financial accounting information.16 This suggests 
that bank opacity can prevent non-regulator outsiders from effectively monitoring and therefore 
allow the regulator to practice forbearance.
17
  
Other studies suggest that opacity could enable regulators to engage in forbearance. 
Huizinga and Laeven (2012) document that publicly traded U.S. bank holding companies 
increased opacity by understating loan loss provisions and other write-downs during the recent 
crisis. They suggest that regulators may have been complicit in allowing banks to increase 
                                                 
15
 The authors argue that the bank they investigate is very similar to the small U.S. commercial banks examined in 
this study in terms of its business model and funding (in that both primarily involve individuals and small businesses 
in the local area). 
 
16
 Depositors may not have run during this period because they were being compensated for their risk exposure. 
However, the authors show that depositors were not receiving higher interest rates during this period, consistent with 
them being unaware of both the bank’s problems as well as the hiding of those problems through opacity. 
 
17
 This raises the question: why do we observe depositors (especially uninsured accounts) in opaque banks? First, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that uninsured depositors in commercial banks are usually local individuals or small 
businesses, who may simply desire a local bank for convenience and thus not highly rate transparency. Second, 
depositors at small banks are likely unsophisticated (Berger and Turk-Ariss 2013) and thus may not be aware that 
their bank is opaque. Even though U.S. commercial bank information is publicly available, the costs of accessing 
and understanding it may be too costly for these depositors. Thus, unsophisticated depositors could rationally be 
unaware of bank opacity if the costs of assessing opacity outweigh the potential benefit (timely information about 
potential loss of deposits). Finally, uninsured depositors at an opaque bank may receive higher yields as 
compensation for risk. 
14 
opacity so that they were not forced to intervene. Skinner (2008) provides evidence that Japanese 
regulators altered financial accounting standards in a way that allowed troubled banks to appear 
well-capitalized during its banking crisis in the late 1990s.
18
 
In summary, if a bank exhibits risk and weakness through its financial accounting 
information, regulators could feel pressured to intervene in a timely manner. On the other hand, 
if a bank conceals its troubles through opacity, regulators should be better able to practice 
forbearance. This leads to the first hypothesis (stated in the alternative): 
H1: Bank opacity is positively associated with regulatory forbearance 
 The ability to practice forbearance should matter more when the incentives to practice 
forbearance are stronger. As discussed in section 2.2, forbearance can be a prudent regulatory 
policy if the failure of one institution can lead to liquidity problems at otherwise healthy 
institutions that were connected financially to the troubled bank. If bank opacity enables 
forbearance, and regulators have stronger incentives to forbear on connected banks, then the 
relation between bank opacity and forbearance should be stronger for these banks. This serves as 
the basis for the second hypothesis (stated in the alternative): 
H2: The positive association between bank opacity and regulatory forbearance is stronger for 
connected banks 
 Opacity enables forbearance by inhibiting outside monitoring. As mentioned above, 
uninsured depositors have strong incentives to monitor banks since troubled banks may increase 
risk shifting in an attempt to achieve solvency, which can erode enterprise value and depositor 
funds. On the other hand, insured depositors’ payoffs will not change regardless of whether the 
bank is closed or allowed to continue operating, and therefore insured depositors should be less 
                                                 
18
 Blacconiere (1991) and Blacconiere et al. (1991) examine the market reaction to and use of Regulatory 
Accounting Principles (RAP). U.S. bank regulators allowed savings and loan associations to use RAP, which 
compared to GAAP led to higher equity values, during the S&L crisis in the 1980s. 
15 
likely to monitor. If opacity disguises forbearance from outside monitoring, then the opacity 
should play a stronger role in forbearance when a greater proportion of deposits are uninsured. 
This leads to the third hypothesis (stated in the alternative): 
H3: The positive association between bank opacity and regulatory forbearance is stronger for 
banks with a greater proportion of deposits that are uninsured 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND SAMPLE 
 
3.1 Bank opacity proxy 
I employ delayed expected loan loss recognition (DELR) as my proxy for bank opacity 
(Bushman and Williams 2012, 2013). DELR captures the extent to which bank managers 
incorporate expected future loan losses when determining the current period’s loan loss 
provision. As mentioned earlier, loan loss provisioning is a key accounting choice for banks, as it 
affects characteristics of earnings and the informational aspects of financial statements relating to 
loan portfolio risk (Bushman and Williams 2012). Furthermore, delaying the recognition of 
expected loan losses forces the reported capital ratio to cover both expected and unexpected 
losses, thus decreasing transparency due to the uncertainty regarding the ability to absorb losses 
(Bushman and Williams 2013).
19
 Prior research has shown that delayed loan loss provisioning is 
associated with diminished outside monitoring, consistent with it reducing bank transparency 
(Vyas 2011; Bushman and Williams 2012). Furthermore, banks that under-provisioned for loan 
losses during the crisis made other opacity-increasing accounting choices (Huizinga and Laeven 
2012). Thus, a bank with high DELR is likely opaque along multiple dimensions. 
I follow prior literature in measuring DELR (Beatty and Liao 2011; Bushman and 
Williams 2013). I first estimate the following two regressions over the past 20 quarters for each 
bank in my sample, requiring a minimum 12 quarters of non-missing data for each bank: 
                                                                    (1) 
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 Bank capital is generally viewed as providing a buffer against unexpected losses, while loan loss provisioning is 
generally viewed as a buffer against expected losses (Laeven and Majnoni 2003). 
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                      (2) 
LLP is the bank’s loan loss provision scaled by total loans. ΔNPL is the change in non-
performing loans scaled by total loans. Tier 1 Ratio and Size are the bank’s tier 1 capital ratio 
and natural logarithm of total assets at the beginning of the period, respectively. EBLLP is the 
bank’s pre-tax earnings before the loan loss provision deduction.  
Expected loss recognition (ELR) is the adjusted R-squared from model 2 minus the 
adjusted R-squared from model 1, and thus captures the incremental explanatory power of future 
and current changes in the non-performing loans ratio for the current loan loss provision. I 
multiply ELR by negative one to create DELR, my proxy for delayed expected loan loss 
recognition. I also employ High DELR, which is an indicator equal to one if DELR is greater 
than or equal to zero, and zero otherwise. 
3.2 Regulatory forbearance proxy 
 While regulators generally announce when a bank is being closed, they do not publicly 
disclose the decision to forbear on a particular bank. Prior studies examine the likelihood of bank 
failure as a means of measuring regulatory forbearance; however, this approach does not capture 
important differences in intensity of the application of forbearance. For example, a regulator 
applies considerably more forbearance by choosing not to close a troubled bank than by allowing 
a reasonably healthy bank to stay open. Therefore, I create a continuous measure of forbearance 
that captures the extent to which regulators apply forbearance on a bank in the following year. 
 I first estimate the following regression over the entire sample: 
                                   (3) 
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 Equation 3 models a bank failure indicator variable (Fail) as a function of the bank’s tier 
1 capital ratio (Tier 1 Ratio) and non-performing loans ratio (NPL). These variables are 
commonly used measures of bank health, and prior research has found them to be strong 
predictors of bank failure (Wheelock and Wilson 2000; Lu and Whidbee 2012). Tier 1 Ratio is 
the main measure of bank health used by regulators. Maintaining a tier 1 ratio below required 
levels is the primary reason for bank closure. Since Tier 1 Ratio can be affected by accounting 
discretion, I also include NPL as a proxy for the quality of the bank’s loan portfolio.20 Banks 
with more loans classified as non-performing have a greater likelihood of incurring losses and 
experiencing insolvency, since their primary assets are not generating income. From this 
regression, I create a predicted probability of being closed in the following year for each bank-
year (Failure Probability). This predicted probability is an ex post assessment of the likelihood 
of failure based on observable summary measures of bank health. 
 My proxy for forbearance, Forbear, is measured as: 
           {
                             
           
}  
 Intuitively, this measure captures the weakness of a bank (as measured by predicted 
failure probability) that is not closed in the following year. Forbear will be higher for banks with 
a greater predicted probability of failing in the following year, but that were ultimately not closed 
by regulators. On the other hand, Forbear will be lower for banks that had a low likelihood of 
failing in the following year and did not fail (healthy banks that did not need forbearance) and 
banks that ultimately failed (troubled banks on which regulators did not practice forbearance). 
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 While NPL is unaffected by accruals-based earnings management, it can be affected by real earnings management. 
For example, a bank could offer a delinquent borrower a new loan to be used to pay off the existing past-due loan, 
effectively reclassifying the loan from non-performing to performing. 
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 As noted above, prior empirical studies on forbearance (e.g., Brown and Dinç (2011)) 
examine bank failures and interpret negative associations between the probability of failing and 
the variable of interest (e.g. the health of the banking sector) as forbearance. I also examine 
whether opacity is negatively associated with the probability of being closed by regulators during 
the following year, consistent with opacity enabling regulators to delay intervention. 
3.3 Estimating the effect of opacity on forbearance 
To examine the relation between opacity and regulatory forbearance, I estimate the 
following model using OLS regression: 
                          ∑                         (4) 
As discussed above, my primary measure of regulatory forbearance is Forbear and my 
opacity proxy is DELR.
21
 To mitigate endogeneity concerns and to be consistent with recent 
research on transparency (Lang and Maffett 2011; Maffett 2012), I measure DELR and control 
variables with a lag.
22
 Since Forbear represents the forbearance applied to the bank in year t+1, 
the coefficient on DELR represents the effect of opacity on forbearance in the following year. If 
opacity enables forbearance, I expect that the coefficient on DELR will be positive. 
I include an extensive set of control variables that likely determined bank weakness and 
regulatory interventions during the recent financial crisis: the natural logarithm of total assets 
(Size), total loans scaled by total assets (Loans), annual return on assets (ROA), the standard 
deviation of quarterly return on assets over the prior 12 quarters (ROA Volatility), the ratio of 
cash to deposits (Liquidity), the ratio of 100 percent risk-weighted assets to total risk-weighted 
assets (Asset Risk), the loan loss reserve scaled by total loans (Loan Loss Reserve), the loan loss 
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 Since the calculation of DELR requires next quarter’s change in NPL ratio, I calculate DELR using loan loss 
provision data for the 20-quarter window ending in the third quarter of year t. If I included the fourth quarter’s loan 
loss provision in this calculation, DELR would be missing for banks that failed early in the subsequent year. 
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 I also measure DELR before Forbear out of necessity, since closed banks stop filing call reports. 
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provision scaled by total loans (Loan Loss Provision), and the percentage of the loan portfolio 
composed of certain loan types (Real Estate Loans, Consumer Loans, Agriculture Loans, and 
Commercial Loans). I also include regulator and U.S. census region fixed effects to control for 
incentives to practice forbearance that may vary by regulator or region.
23
 
To examine whether the relation between opacity and regulatory forbearance is stronger 
for connected banks (H2), I add to equation 4 the interaction terms of DELR and measures of 
bank connectedness, and estimate the following regression: 
                                             
                            ∑                          (5) 
 To measure a bank’s connectedness, I employ measures that are based on (1) intra-bank 
financing activity and (2) size. Regulators would likely prefer to delay intervening into banks 
that were connected to other banks through intra-bank borrowing and lending. Allen and Gale 
(2000) show that liquidity shocks (such as the failure of a bank) can spread throughout the 
financial sector if banks are connected by lending and borrowing. Acharya et al. (2009) argue 
that the government bailed out Bear Stearns in 2008 because “it was a major player” in the intra-
bank borrowing and lending market. Consistent with prior research, I employ intra-bank 
financing activity as a proxy for connectedness (Allen and Gale 2000; Brown and Dinç 2011). 
Intra-bank borrowing and lending is generally accomplished using repurchasing and reselling 
agreements, respectively. My first measure of connectedness is High BorrowLend, an indicator 
variable equal to one if the bank has both repurchase agreements and reselling agreements (both 
scaled by total assets) above the median of all banks, and zero otherwise. Connectedness is also 
likely increasing in size. During the crisis, it was asserted that certain banks were considered 
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 I do not include Tier 1 Ratio and NPL when Forbear is the dependent variable, but I do include them when 
examining the probability of bank failure (Fail). 
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“too big to fail” since they were so large and interconnected that their failure would be disastrous 
for the rest of the financial sector (Acharya et al. 2009). Therefore, I also use High Size, an 
indicator equal to one if the bank has total assets above the sample median and zero otherwise. 
 I first estimate equation 4 separately for connected banks and non-connected banks 
(where connectedness is measured by High BorrowLend and High Size). This allows me to hold 
the incentives to forbear relatively constant within each sample, and isolate the effect of opacity 
on the ability to practice forbearance. I estimate equation 5 over the full sample, including 
interaction terms between DELR and the two connectedness measures, to test whether the ability 
to practice forbearance as provided by opacity is more important where incentives are strongest. 
I predict that the coefficients on the interactions between DELR and High BorrowLend and 
between DELR and High Size should be positive. 
To examine whether the relation between opacity and regulatory forbearance varies by 
the proportion of deposits that are uninsured (H3), I add to equation 4 the interaction terms of 
DELR and an indicator variable that captures whether the bank has a relatively greater amount of 
uninsured deposits, and estimate the following regression for each regulator: 
                                              
                            ∑                          (6) 
 To measure whether a bank has a relatively high proportion of uninsured deposits, I 
ideally would estimate the ratio of uninsured deposits to total deposits at year-end. 
Unfortunately, beginning in 2006 most U.S. commercial banks no longer had to indicate their 
uninsured deposits in their publicly available call report data. Therefore, I measure the ratio of 
uninsured deposits to total deposits at year-end 2005. I create the indicator variable High 
Uninsured, which equals one if the bank has an uninsured deposits to total deposits ratio above 
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the sample median as of year-end 2005, and zero otherwise. If regulators have a greater need for 
opacity in order to successfully forbear on banks with a higher proportion of uninsured deposits, 
then the coefficient on the interaction of DELR and High Uninsured should be positive. 
3.4 Sample and descriptive statistics 
This study employs a sample of small, primarily private U.S. commercial banks during 
the recent financial crisis. This setting has several advantageous features for testing the effect of 
opacity on forbearance. First, U.S. bank regulators likely practiced forbearance during the recent 
crisis (Brown and Dinç 2011). The OCC has even acknowledged that it practiced forbearance 
(Rapoport 2013). Second, there were a number of bank failures during this period, providing the 
variation needed to examine forbearance. Third, these banks have simple business models; they 
use depositor funds to create loans. Thus, it is likely that regulators were aware of bank risk, 
suggesting that the decision not to intervene is attributable to forbearance rather than ignorance. 
A government report issued after the crisis stated that regulators were slow to intervene in weak 
banks despite being aware of troubles (GAO 2011). Fourth, the dominant non-regulator 
stakeholders in these banks are unsophisticated depositors, such as local individuals and small 
businesses, who are unlikely to be able to fully unravel opacity. Finally, banks in my sample face 
a relatively similar economic and regulatory environment, which allows me to better identify the 
effect of opacity on forbearance. 
 I gather call report data from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago website and bank 
failure data from the FDIC website. Accounting and regulatory data is measured annually from 
2006 to 2009, and bank failures are measured from 2007 to 2010.
24
 To make the final sample, a 
bank-year observation must have non-missing values for DELR and each control variable. Table 
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 I do not observe any bank failures in 2005 or 2006, and thus I measure bank failures beginning in 2007. This 
corresponds to the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ timeline of the financial crisis, which states that the first signs 
of the crisis occurred in early 2007. 
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1 describes the composition of the final sample. The biggest cause of sample attrition is the data 
requirements for the computation of DELR.
25
 The final sample contains 26,510 bank-years 
representing 7,435 unique commercial banks, 258 of which failed during the sample period. 
 Table 2 contains the descriptive statistics for the sample.
26
 Approximately 1 percent of 
bank-years were followed by the bank’s closure. The median amount of assets in the sample is 
$147 million, and 92 percent of the bank-years had assets under $1 billion. Untabulated statistics 
show that the median loans to assets ratio in my sample is 0.67 and the median deposits to assets 
ratio is 0.84, consistent with the sample being mainly populated by small commercial banks 
focusing on a traditional “deposits and loans” business model. 
Table 3 presents the results of estimating equation 3 using logistic regression with Fail as 
a function of Tier 1 Ratio and NPL in panel A, and the descriptive statistics for Forbear in panel 
B. As shown in panel A, the coefficient on Tier 1 Ratio is negative and highly significant, 
indicating that banks with higher capital ratios were much less likely to fail. NPL exhibits a 
strongly positive coefficient, consistent with a poorer quality loan portfolio leading to a higher 
probability of failure. 
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 Banks with missing values for DELR are generally de novo banks (commercial banks in operation for five years 
or less) without a sufficient history to estimate DELR. Their failure rate during the crisis was not different from 
banks included in the final sample.  
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 All accounting variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent levels. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
 
4.1 Effect of opacity on forbearance 
First, I test whether opacity is associated with greater forbearance (H1). Table 4 presents 
the estimation of equation 4 using OLS with Forbear as the dependent variable and DELR as the 
opacity proxy in columns 1 and 2.
27
 The estimation in column 1 includes the full set of control 
variables, and the estimation in column 2 contains both the set of control variables as well as 
regulator and region fixed effects. Both models have decent explanatory power (adjusted R-
squared of approximately 0.15). Several variables that capture bank risk are positively associated 
with Forbear, including ROA Volatility and Asset Risk. Banks that were more profitable and 
more liquid (as measured by higher values of ROA and Liquidity) were less likely to experience 
forbearance. The variable of interest, DELR, exhibits a positive and significant coefficient in 
both models (p-value of 0.03), indicating that opacity is associated with greater forbearance. I 
repeat these analyses using High DELR instead of DELR in columns 3 and 4, and find similar 
results. Overall, the results in table 4 are consistent with opacity enabling forbearance. 
4.2 Opacity, forbearance, and bank connectedness 
Next, I examine whether the positive association between opacity and forbearance is 
stronger for connected banks, consistent with regulators preferring to forbear on connected banks 
(H2). This analysis is presented in table 5; panel A (panel B) displays the results employing High 
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 For consistency across analyses, assessments of statistical significance are based on Huber-White 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and two-tailed hypothesis tests. For tests such as the pre-crisis opacity 
test, clustering errors by bank is not meaningful. Where possible, inferences are unchanged if instead I cluster 
standard errors by bank, by regulator, or by region, or if I employ bootstrapped standard errors. 
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BorrowLend (High Size) as the measure of connectedness. For brevity, only the coefficients on 
the variables of interest are reported. Column 1 of panel A contains the estimation of equation 4 
within bank-years classified as having both high borrowing and high lending activity (High 
BorrowLend equal to one). DELR exhibits a strong positive association with Forbear within this 
subsample (p-value of 0.02). Column 2 presents the estimation of equation 4 within the 
subsample of bank-years with a High BorrowLend value of zero. While DELR is positively 
associated with Forbear in this subsample, the coefficient is not statistically significant at 
conventional levels (p-value of 0.16). Finally, column 3 presents the results of estimating 
equation 5 over the entire sample. Both the interaction of DELR and High BorrowLend and the 
sum of the coefficients on DELR and the interaction term are significantly positive. The main 
effect of DELR on Forbear is positive but not significant, consistent with the results in column 2. 
Panel B repeats the analysis in panel A using High Size as the proxy for connectedness. 
The results are broadly similar to those presented in panel A. DELR exhibits a positive 
coefficient in both the large bank and small bank subsamples, but is only significantly associated 
with Forbear within large banks (p-value of 0.03). The interaction of DELR and High Size is 
positive but not significant in column 3. However, the sum of the coefficients on DELR and the 
interaction term is positive and statistically significant (p-value of 0.04). The results in table 5 
are consistent with regulators preferring to forbear on connected banks and opacity enabling 
them to successfully practice forbearance. If the failure of a connected bank can potentially 
spread liquidity problems throughout the financial sector, then opacity may be desirable as it 
enables regulators to forbear on these banks. 
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4.3 Opacity, forbearance, and uninsured depositors 
In table 6, I examine whether the effect of opacity on forbearance varies by the 
proportion of deposits that are uninsured. Column 1 contains the estimation of equation 4 within 
bank-years that have a ratio of uninsured deposits to total deposits above the sample median 
(High Uninsured equal to one). The coefficient on DELR is strongly positive in this subsample 
(p-value of 0.02). Column 2 presents this same estimation within bank-years having a High 
Uninsured value of zero. While DELR is positively associated with Forbear in this subsample, 
the coefficient is not statistically significant. Finally, column 3 presents the results of estimating 
equation 6 over the entire sample. The interaction of DELR and High Uninsured is positive 
although not significant at conventional levels (p-value of 0.15). However, the sum of the 
coefficients on DELR and the interaction term is highly significant (p-value of 0.01). Overall, the 
results in table 6 are consistent with opacity being an important factor in regulators’ ability to 
practice forbearance on banks with a greater proportion of deposits that are uninsured, since 
these depositors are more likely to monitor the bank.  
4.4 Opacity and bank failures 
Brown and Dinç (2011) empirically examine regulatory forbearance using the incidence 
of bank failures. To examine the robustness of my results to this approach, I estimate versions of 
equations 4, 5, and 6 with Fail instead of Forbear as the dependent variable using logistic 
regression.
28
 Table 7 displays the results of these regressions; for brevity, I do not report the 
coefficients on the control variables or fixed effects. The model in column 1 contains the full set 
of control variables including Tier 1 Ratio and NPL, but does not include regulator and region 
fixed effects. The coefficient on DELR is negative and statistically significant (p-value of 0.05), 
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 Additionally, examining bank failures confirms that DELR is not simply associated with a higher incidence of 
failures, which could be consistent with the results in tables 4 through 6. 
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indicating that opaque banks were less likely to fail during the crisis. DELR continues to exhibit 
a negative and significant coefficient when regulator and region fixed effects are added in 
column 2. Based on the coefficient in column 2, the average marginal effect (AME) of a one-
standard deviation change in DELR is -0.1 percent, which is 10 percent of the sample mean. For 
comparison, the AME for a one-standard deviation change in Tier 1 Ratio (NPL) is -2.4 percent 
(0.3 percent) (results untabulated). Therefore, although primary measures of bank health such as 
Tier 1 Ratio and NPL exhibit stronger associations with the probability of failure, DELR exhibits 
an economically significant association with bank failures during the crisis. 
I also re-estimate the analyses in tables 5 and 6 using Fail instead of Forbear. The 
interaction term of DELR and High BorrowLend as well as the sum of the coefficients on DELR 
and the interaction term are negative and statistically significant in column 3, consistent with the 
results in panel A of table 5. The coefficients on the interaction terms in columns 4 (DELR*High 
Size) and 5 (DELR*High Uninsured) are negative but not significant. However, similar to the 
results in panel B of table 5 and table 6, the sum of the coefficients on DELR and the interaction 
terms in these two columns is significantly negative. The cross-sectional results in columns 3, 4, 
and 5 are largely similar to those presented in tables 5 and 6. Coupled with the findings presented 
in tables 4, 5, and 6, these results suggest that DELR exhibits a strong positive association with 
Forbear and a negative association with actual bank failure. This pattern is consistent with 
opacity enabling regulators to allow troubled banks to continue operating. 
4.5 Changes in opacity 
 Recent research has found that banks increased opacity during the financial crisis by 
under-provisioning for loan losses (Vyas 2011; Huizinga and Laeven 2012). Huizinga and 
Laeven (2012) suggest that regulators were complicit in allowing banks to increase opacity 
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during the crisis, as it allowed regulators to avoid intervention. This suggests that changes in 
opacity should affect the regulators’ ability to practice forbearance during the crisis. To examine 
this, I estimate three different versions of equation 4. The first three panels of Table 8 contain the 
results from this analysis, where only the coefficients of interest are reported for brevity. First, I 
replace DELR with ΔDELR, which is measured as this year’s DELR minus last year’s DELR. 
Panel A presents the results of estimating equation 4 with ΔDELR and other variables in levels. 
The coefficient on ΔDELR is significantly positive (p-value of 0.02). Second, I estimate a fully 
first differenced version of equation 4, where each variable is measured as the change over the 
current year. Panel B of table 8 contains the results from the fully first differenced specification. 
The coefficient on ΔDELR remains positive and significant (p-value of 0.02).29 Third, I estimate 
equation 4 using Fail as the dependent variable and ΔDELR as the opacity proxy. Again, I find 
similar results to those presented in table 7; the coefficient on ΔDELR in panel C is negative and 
statistically significant (p-value of 0.08). Overall, the results in table 8 are consistent with 
changes in opacity increasing regulators’ ability to practice forbearance. 
4.6 Fixed effects 
 There are likely bank-level factors that could drive the choice of opacity as well as the 
regulator’s decision to forbear on or intervene in the bank. However, many potential correlated 
omitted variables would actually suggest a negative relation between opacity and forbearance. 
For example, bank management quality could represent a bank-level factor that affects opacity 
and forbearance. More capable bank managers are likely better at forecasting and recognizing 
expected loan losses, and regulators will be more likely to forbear on banks run by quality 
management since these banks will have a greater chance of recovering without costly 
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 The sample size decreases for this test since Forbear is not defined before 2006 (as there were no failures in the 
years leading up to the financial crisis). 
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intervention.
30
 Similarly, regulators may be more confident in a bank’s ability to improve 
without intervention if it has a high quality internal information environment, and these banks 
are likely better able to provide transparency. While the fully first differenced test in panel B of 
table 8 suggests that unobservable bank-level characteristics are not responsible for my results, I 
provide additional assurance that the results above are not caused by a correlated omitted 
variable by re-estimating the main forbearance regression (equation 4) using fixed effects 
regression. The results of this estimation are presented in panel D of table 8, where only the 
coefficient on DELR is presented for brevity. Despite the few observations per bank in the 
sample period, the coefficient on DELR remains positive and significant, suggesting that 
unobservable bank-level characteristics that are constant across the sample period are not 
responsible for the positive association between opacity and forbearance. 
4.7 Simultaneity: pre-crisis opacity and instrumental variables 
 Since regulators can influence the choice of bank opacity, the previously documented 
association between opacity and forbearance could be attributed to either explicit or implicit 
collusion between the regulator and bank management. Prior research has shown that bank 
regulators have altered financial accounting at the industry level, a form of explicit collusion that 
enabled regulatory forbearance (Skinner 2008). Regulators can also directly affect bank-level 
accounting (Curry et al. 1999), and during the crisis they may have instructed banks to increase 
opacity to enable forbearance. Regulators could also affect opacity through implicit collusion by 
allowing banks to misreport without intervening (Huizinga and Laeven 2012). Since collusion 
suggests that regulators influence both the choice of bank opacity and forbearance, my results 
could be attributed to simultaneity. 
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 Of course, bank management can turnover and thus bank management quality is not a permanent bank 
characteristic. Unfortunately, bank management turnover data is not available for my sample. 
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I conduct two tests to examine whether simultaneity is wholly responsible for the positive 
relation between opacity and forbearance. First, I examine the effect of pre-crisis opacity on 
forbearance and the probability of failure during the crisis. If regulators did not anticipate the 
crisis, then they likely did not influence pre-crisis opacity out of a desire to enable forbearance. 
A positive relation between pre-crisis opacity and forbearance would be consistent with opacity 
enabling regulators to practice forbearance. Furthermore, pre-crisis opacity likely led non-
regulator stakeholders to incorrectly assess the bank’s risk and solvency at the onset of the crisis. 
According to the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ crisis timeline, the first signs of the recent 
crisis occurred in early 2007.
31
 Therefore, I estimate a cross-sectional version of equation 4 
measuring DELR and High DELR, as well as the rest of my control variables, at year-end 2006. I 
measure Forbear and Fail as the forbearance and likelihood of failure during the entire crisis 
period (2007 to 2010), respectively.
32
 The results of this analysis are presented in table 9, with 
Forbear (Fail) as the dependent variable in panel A (panel B). Although the coefficient on DELR 
is positive in panel A, it is not statistically significant at conventional levels (p-value of 0.14). 
However, the coefficient on High DELR is positive and statistically significant (p-value of 0.02). 
In the failure regressions in panel B, both DELR and High DELR exhibit strong negative 
associations with the probability of failing during the crisis (p-values of 0.01 and 0.04, 
respectively). Assuming that regulators were not influencing pre-crisis opacity to enable 
forbearance during the crisis, these results suggest that simultaneity is not wholly responsible for 
the positive association between opacity and forbearance. Furthermore, they are consistent with 
pre-crisis opacity enabling regulatory forbearance. 
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 http://timeline.stlouisfed.org/ 
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 In this analysis, Fail is defined as an indicator variable equal to one if the bank failed during the crisis (2007 to 
2010) and zero otherwise, and Forbear is calculated as described in section 2 using this version of Fail and the year-
end 2006 values for Tier 1 Ratio and NPL. 
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 I also employ instrumental variables to mitigate endogeneity concerns. My first 
instrument is Lagged NPL Volatility, which is measured as the standard deviation of NPL for the 
20 quarter period from years t-3 to t-7.
33
 I expect that banks with greater uncertainty regarding 
loan portfolio quality will reserve more for future loan portfolio deteriorations. Therefore, I 
predict a negative association between DELR and Lagged NPL Volatility. This measure may be 
correlated with bank risk, which could affect forbearance and bank failure. However, I already 
include a more current measure of bank risk, ROA Volatility, as well as other variables that 
capture the riskiness of the bank’s assets (Asset Risk) and exposure to risk factors specific to the 
recent crisis such as the real estate market (Real Estate Loans). Furthermore, this variable is 
measured using only pre-crisis years, and thus will be unaffected by volatility in the non-
performing loans ratio during the crisis. My second instrument is Data Processing Fees, which is 
the natural logarithm of the average quarterly data processing fees in that year. I expect that 
banks that are engaging outside contractors for data processing services are attempting to better 
anticipate loan portfolio quality changes, allowing them to incorporate them in the current 
period’s loan loss provision. Therefore, I predict a negative association between DELR and Data 
Processing Fees. Banks that spend more on data processing may exhibit better performance or 
could be attempting to remedy poor past performance, which in turn can influence the regulator’s 
forbearance decision. However, I directly control for profitability (ROA) in both stages. 
 The first stage regression, estimating DELR as a function of the two instruments and 
other control variables, is presented in panel A of table 10. Both Lagged NPL Volatility and Data 
Processing Fees exhibit strong negative associations with DELR. The partial R-squared is 0.1 
percent, and the partial F-statistic is 10.68 (p-value < 0.001). This partial F-statistic is greater 
than the Stock and Yogo (2001) and Stock et al. (2002) critical value for a 5 percent confidence 
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 I chose this 20 quarter period in order to avoid overlap with ROA Volatility and to have some overlap with DELR. 
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threshold for 20 percent size distortion, but slightly less than the critical value for a 15 percent 
size distortion. Thus, these two variables appear to be relatively strong instruments for DELR. 
 Panel B of table 10 presents the second stage regression of the fitted value of DELR on 
Forbear. For brevity, I only report the coefficient on the fitted value of DELR, which remains 
positive and significant (p-value < 0.01). Compared to the OLS results, the coefficient on the 
fitted value of DELR is larger, but this is driven by the smaller standard deviation of the fitted 
variable.
34
 An overidentification test fails to reject the null that the instruments are not correlated 
with the error term in the second stage, and a Hausman test suggests that DELR suffers from 
endogeneity (p-value < 0.001). Overall, the results in tables 9 and 10 suggest that simultaneity is 
not entirely responsible for the positive relation between opacity and forbearance. 
4.8 Alternative opacity measure 
 I employ DELR for my primary tests since prior research suggests that the underreporting 
of expected loan losses will reduce the ability of non-regulator stakeholders to monitor the bank 
(Bushman and Williams 2012) and thus enable regulators to practice forbearance. I examine the 
robustness of my inferences to an alternative opacity proxy which captures the propensity to use 
discretion in the determination of the loan loss provision to smooth earnings. Huizinga and 
Laeven (2012) find that banks that historically engaged in discretionary loan loss provisioning 
were slow to recognize losses during the crisis. Bushman and Williams (2012) find that 
discretionary loan loss provisioning is associated with weaker bank monitoring. 
 To estimate discretionary loan loss provisioning, I estimate the following two regressions 
over the past 20 quarters for each bank in my sample, requiring a minimum of 12 quarters of 
non-missing data for each bank (variables are defined in section 3.2): 
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 Untabulated results show that the effect of a one-standard deviation change in the fitted value of DELR on 
Forbear is similar to a one-standard deviation change in DELR. 
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             (7) 
                                                              
                      (8) 
Discretionary loan loss provisioning (Smoothing) is measured as the adjusted R-squared 
from equation 8 minus the adjusted R-squared from equation 7, and represents the incremental 
explanatory power of earnings before the loan loss provision (EBLLP) for the current loan loss 
provision. In table 11, I re-estimate equation 4 using Smoothing as the proxy for bank opacity 
and both Forbear and Fail as dependent variables. Consistent with opacity enabling forbearance 
(as well as with the results in tables 4 and 7), the coefficient on Smoothing is positive and 
significant when Forbear is the dependent variable (panel A) and negative and significant when 
Fail is the dependent variable (panel B). Furthermore, untabulated analyses show that the 
inferences from tables 5 through 8 are largely unaffected when employing Smoothing as the 
opacity proxy. The results in table 11 suggest that other aspects of bank opacity, such as 
discretionary loan loss provisioning, enable regulators to successfully practice forbearance. 
4.9 Additional robustness tests 
 A large percentage of the commercial banks in my sample have a very low probability of 
failing during the crisis. Opacity should not play an important role in a regulator’s decision to 
allow a healthy bank to continue operating. To examine whether the effect of opacity on 
forbearance is driven by troubled banks, I re-estimate my analyses using all bank-years with a 
failure probability above the sample median. Untabulated results are similar to those presented in 
the study. Furthermore, if opacity is more important for the regulator’s ability to forbear when 
the bank is weaker, then the relation between DELR and Forbear should vary at different parts of 
34 
the Forbear distribution. To examine this hypothesis, I estimate equation 4 using quantile 
regression. Untabulated results show that the positive association between Forbear and DELR is 
strongest within the top 20 percent of the Forbear distribution.
35 
This finding is consistent with 
opacity playing a more important role in forbearance in weaker banks.
36
 
I also examine the robustness of my results to additional control variables. Managerial 
ability potentially drives both the choice of opacity as well as the regulators’ decision to practice 
forbearance. Unfortunately, data on executive compensation, a common measure of managerial 
ability, is not available for my sample. Instead, I employ the natural logarithm of average 
quarterly salary expense as a proxy for managerial ability. Inferences are unaffected by the 
inclusion of this variable. My results are also robust to the inclusion of a set of control variables 
that more fully captures the composition of the bank’s loan portfolio (all scaled by total loans): 
depository loans, government loans, foreign loans, and other loans. Finally, inferences are 
unaffected by the inclusion of the following variables: net charge-offs, loan growth, an indicator 
variable that captures whether the bank is owned by a bank-holding company, and an indicator 
variable that captures whether the bank or its bank-holding company are publicly traded.
37,38  
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 I also find that the cross-sectional results in tables 5 and 6 are strongest within this portion of the Forbear 
distribution (results untabulated). 
 
36
 Additionally, I examine the robustness of my results to employing a variable equal to the percentile rank of 
Forbear. Inferences are generally similar when estimating versions of equations 4, 5, and 6 using the ranked version 
of Forbear as the dependent variable, both DELR and Smoothing as opacity proxies, the full set of control variables, 
and bank fixed effects (results untabulated). 
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 I conduct several additional robustness tests. First, Forbear is bounded below by zero. Inferences are robust to 
employing tobit regression instead of OLS regression. Second, estimating non-linear models with many zeroes is 
potentially problematic. To reduce the amount of zeroes in the failure regressions, I remove banks that both did not 
fail and had a low probability of failing. Inferences are unchanged when estimating the bank failure regressions after 
eliminating observations with a Failure Probability less than the sample median. 
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 If opacity inhibits monitoring by depositors, then opaque banks should have experienced less deposit erosion 
during the crisis. To examine this, I estimate the annual change in deposits in current year (scaled by assets) as a 
function of DELR. I include the full set of control variables in this regression, as well as Tier 1 Ratio and NPL. 
Untabulated results indicate that DELR is positively associated with deposit changes during the crisis (p-value of 
0.06). While this effect is stronger for banks with a greater ratio of uninsured deposits to total deposits, the 
35 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
In this study I provide evidence that one bank-level factor, opacity, is positively 
associated with regulatory forbearance. Furthermore, I find that the positive effect of opacity on 
forbearance is stronger when (1) the regulators’ incentives to practice forbearance are greater, 
and (2) monitoring by creditors is likely to be greater. My results are consistent with opacity 
inhibiting non-regulator outsiders from assessing bank risk, thus disguising the extent to which 
regulators engage in forbearance. These results further our understanding of regulatory actions 
by identifying conditions under which regulators are more successful in practicing forbearance.  
The inferences in this study have implications for the recent debate about bank 
transparency. Bank opacity has been suggested as one of the contributing factors to the recent 
financial crisis as it prevented outsiders from understanding the health and risk of individual 
banks (Bank for International Settlements 2012). However, recent research suggests that bank 
opacity may actually be optimal (Holmstrom 2012; Dang et al. 2012; Dang et al. 2013; Siritto 
2013). My results suggest that bank opacity can be desirable during a crisis period if opacity 
enables regulatory forbearance as a means to provide banks an opportunity to recover without 
costly intervention and prevent the spread of problems throughout the banking system. 
The conclusions in this study are subject to several caveats. First, regulatory forbearance 
is inherently unobservable. This study, like prior research on this topic, uses estimates of 
forbearance. In addition to examining the probability of bank failure, I develop a new measure of 
                                                 
difference is not statistically significant. Furthermore DELR is negatively but insignificantly associated with the 
likelihood of a negative deposit change. 
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forbearance that captures the intensity with which regulators apply forbearance. Second, it could 
be the case that regulators themselves were unaware of problems in opaque banks. However, this 
seems unlikely given the simplicity of the “deposits and loans” business model and anecdotal 
evidence that U.S. regulators practiced forbearance on commercial banks during the crisis. 
Furthermore, cross-sectional results are consistent with opacity enabling regulators to practice 
forbearance to prevent contagion and to disguise forbearance from outside monitoring. Third, the 
results do not prove causality. However, the consistency of the results to various specifications, 
including first differences, fixed effects, pre-crisis opacity, and instrumental variables, provides 
insight into the causal effect of opacity on forbearance and offers some assurance that the 
findings are not solely attributable to correlated omitted variables or simultaneity. Finally, the 
results may not be generalizable to other settings. The commercial banks studied in this paper are 
primarily small and private, with simple business models that focus on sourcing both deposits 
and loans locally. Thus, these banks are more likely to have unsophisticated stakeholders that 
cannot unravel bank opacity during crisis periods. Investors and other stakeholders at larger 
financial institutions are likely to be more sophisticated, and thus opacity may not enable 
forbearance in these institutions. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that opacity played a 
role in regulatory forbearance in larger financial institutions as well. Bear Stearns successfully 
hid its problems until it was forced to bail out one of its funds in June 2007. Ultimately, the 
government bailed out Bear Stearns because of its high degree of connectedness to the rest of the 
financial sector (Acharya et al. 2009). A report from the Office of the Inspector General noted 
that the SEC decided not to intervene into Bear Stearns despite being aware of “numerous 
potential red flags.” Future research should examine the effect of opacity on regulatory 
monitoring and actions within the largest and most important financial institutions.  
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TABLE 1: SAMPLE SELECTION 
 
 
  All U.S. commercial banks year-end call reports between 2006 and 2009  30595 
  with non-missing assets and capital ratios   
- Bank-years with missing values for control variables 915 
- Bank-years without data to compute DELR 3170 
  Final sample 26510 
      
  Number of unique banks that failed 258 
  Number of unique banks that did not fail 7177 
 
This table describes the composition of the final sample used in this paper. Variables are defined in the appendix. 
Banks are classified as failed banks if they were closed during the sample period. 
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TABLE 2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
Variables   Mean Std Dev 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl 
Fail   0.010 0.098 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DELR   -0.032 0.133 -0.074 0.001 0.047 
High DELR   0.508 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Tier 1 Ratio   0.148 0.066 0.105 0.127 0.167 
NPL   0.019 0.026 0.003 0.010 0.024 
Size   5.111 1.284 4.237 4.991 5.821 
Loans   0.651 0.147 0.565 0.674 0.759 
ROA   0.018 0.026 0.011 0.022 0.032 
ROA Volatility   0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.005 
Liquidity   0.065 0.063 0.030 0.044 0.075 
Asset Risk   0.768 0.123 0.706 0.791 0.855 
Loan Loss Reserve   0.015 0.008 0.010 0.013 0.017 
Loan Loss Provision   0.007 0.013 0.001 0.003 0.007 
Real Estate Loans   0.702 0.194 0.589 0.736 0.846 
Consumer Loans   0.076 0.080 0.023 0.052 0.100 
Agriculture Loans   0.074 0.122 0.000 0.011 0.097 
Commercial Loans   0.145 0.096 0.078 0.128 0.192 
 
This table contains descriptive statistics for the sample used in this study. All variables are defined in the appendix. 
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TABLE 3: FORBEARANCE PROXY 
 
 
Panel A: Forbear Regression 
 
  Dep Var: Fail 
VARIABLES Pred Sign (1) 
Tier 1 Ratio - -85.694*** 
    (-10.07) 
NPL + 28.758*** 
    (13.12) 
Observations   26,510 
Pseudo R-squared   0.615 
 
 
Panel B: Forbear Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable   Mean Std Dev 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl 
Forbear   0.537 4.048 0.001 0.025 0.168 
 
This table contains the estimation of equation 3 using logistic regression (panel A) and the descriptive statistics for 
Forbear (panel B). In panel A, the dependent variable is Fail, which is an indicator variable equal to one if the bank 
failed in the next year, and zero otherwise. The independent variables are Tier 1 Ratio, the bank’s tier 1 capital ratio, 
and NPL, non-performing loans scaled by total loans. In panel B, Forbear is the predicted probability from the 
regression in panel A for non-failed banks, and zero for failed banks. Z-statistics are based on robust standard errors. 
*, **, and *** represent two-tailed p-values less than 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
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TABLE 4: OPACITY AND FORBEARANCE 
 
  Dep Var: Forbear Forbear Forbear Forbear 
VARIABLES Pred Sign (1) (2) (3) (4) 
DELR + 0.318** 0.314**     
    (2.21) (2.19)     
High DELR +     0.079* 0.077* 
        (1.76) (1.73) 
Size   0.045** 0.045** 0.045** 0.045** 
    (2.04) (1.99) (2.03) (1.99) 
Loans   0.250 0.208 0.252 0.210 
    (1.30) (1.07) (1.30) (1.08) 
ROA   -23.452*** -22.970*** -23.472*** -22.993*** 
    (-11.22) (-11.00) (-11.23) (-11.00) 
ROA Volatility   150.957*** 153.376*** 151.214*** 153.622*** 
    (8.86) (8.95) (8.85) (8.94) 
Liquidity   -0.971** -0.873* -0.979** -0.880* 
    (-2.11) (-1.92) (-2.13) (-1.93) 
Asset Risk   1.104*** 1.241*** 1.103*** 1.238*** 
    (4.85) (5.29) (4.84) (5.28) 
Loan Loss Reserve   25.460*** 25.300*** 25.415*** 25.260*** 
    (3.54) (3.53) (3.54) (3.52) 
Loan Loss Provision   40.459*** 41.227*** 40.418*** 41.181*** 
    (6.26) (6.35) (6.26) (6.35) 
Real Estate Loans   1.919*** 1.897*** 1.914*** 1.892*** 
    (4.09) (3.98) (4.08) (3.97) 
Consumer Loans   0.830 0.676 0.831 0.675 
    (1.55) (1.19) (1.55) (1.19) 
Agriculture Loans   1.778*** 1.750*** 1.774*** 1.746*** 
    (3.59) (3.47) (3.58) (3.46) 
Commercial Loans   0.599 0.627 0.597 0.625 
    (1.20) (1.23) (1.20) (1.23) 
Regulator Effects Included?   NO YES NO YES 
Region Effects Included?   NO YES NO YES 
Observations   26,510 26,510 26,510 26,510 
Adjusted R-squared   0.152 0.153 0.152 0.153 
This table contains the estimation of equation 4 using OLS regression. The dependent variable is Forbear, which is 
the predicted probability from a regression of Fail on Tier 1 Ratio and NPL for non-failed banks, and zero for failed 
banks. The first primary independent variable is DELR, which is the incremental adjusted R-squared from including 
the current and future change in the non-performing loans ratio in the loan loss provision model in Beatty and Liao 
(2011) and Bushman and Williams (2012) multiplied by negative one. The second primary independent variable is 
High DELR, which is an indicator variable equal to one if DELR is greater than or equal to zero, and zero otherwise. 
All other variables are defined in the appendix. t-statistics are based on robust standard errors. *, **, and *** 
represent two-tailed p-values less than 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.  
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TABLE 5: OPACITY AND FORBEARANCE BY CONNECTEDNESS 
 
Panel A: Intra-bank financing activity 
  Sample: High BorrowLend=1 High BorrowLend=0 All Obs 
  Dep Var: Forbear Forbear Forbear 
VARIABLES Pred Sign (1) (2) (3) 
DELR + 0.665** 0.229 0.197 
    (2.34) (1.41) (1.22) 
High BorrowLend ?     -0.148*** 
        (-2.70) 
DELR * High BorrowLend +     0.693** 
        (2.24) 
DELR + DELR*High BorrowLend +     0.890*** 
Controls Included?   YES YES YES 
Regulator Effects Included?   YES YES YES 
Region Effects Included?   YES YES YES 
Observations   4,476 22,034 26,510 
Adjusted R-squared   0.116 0.161 0.153 
 
 
Panel B: Size 
  Sample: High Size=1 High Size=0 All Obs 
  Dep Var: Forbear Forbear Forbear 
VARIABLES Pred Sign (1) (2) (3) 
DELR + 0.546** 0.100 0.124 
    (2.17) (0.74) (0.89) 
High Size ?     0.072 
        (0.93) 
DELR * High Size +     0.381 
        (1.35) 
DELR + DELR*High Size +     0.505** 
Controls Included?   YES YES YES 
Regulator Effects Included?   YES YES YES 
Region Effects Included?   YES YES YES 
Observations   13,257 13,253 26,510 
Adjusted R-squared   0.167 0.134 0.153 
This table contains the estimation of equations 4 and 5 using OLS regression. Panel A (panel B) employs High 
BorrowLend (High Size) as the measure of connectedness. The dependent variable is Forbear, which is the predicted 
probability from a regression of Fail on Tier 1 Ratio and NPL for non-failed banks, and zero for failed banks. The 
primary independent variable is DELR, which is the incremental adjusted R-squared from including the current and 
future change in the non-performing loans ratio in the loan loss provision model in Beatty and Liao (2011) and 
Bushman and Williams (2012) multiplied by negative one. All other variables are defined in the appendix. t-
statistics and F-statistics are based on robust standard errors. *, **, and *** represent two-tailed p-values less than 
0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.  
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TABLE 6: OPACITY AND FORBEARANCE BY UNINSURED DEPOSITS 
 
  Sample: High Uninsured=1 High Uninsured=0 All Obs 
  Dep Var: Forbear Forbear Forbear 
VARIABLES Pred Sign (1) (2) (3) 
DELR + 0.503** 0.114 0.097 
    (2.42) (0.59) (0.50) 
High Uninsured ?     0.048 
        (0.20) 
DELR * High Uninsured +     0.418 
        (1.45) 
DELR + DELR*High Uninsured +     0.515** 
Controls Included?   YES YES YES 
Regulator Effects Included?   YES YES YES 
Region Effects Included?   YES YES YES 
Observations   13,237 13,235 26,472 
Adjusted R-squared   0.163 0.136 0.153 
This table contains the estimation of equations 4 and 6 using OLS regression. The measure of uninsured deposits is 
High Uninsured, which is an indicator equal to one if the bank had a ratio of uninsured deposits to total deposits 
above the sample median as of year-end 2005, and zero otherwise. The dependent variable is Forbear, which is the 
predicted probability from a regression of Fail on Tier 1 Ratio and NPL for non-failed banks, and zero for failed 
banks. The primary independent variable is DELR, which is the incremental adjusted R-squared from including the 
current and future change in the non-performing loans ratio in the loan loss provision model in Beatty and Liao 
(2011) and Bushman and Williams (2012) multiplied by negative one. All other variables are defined in the 
appendix. t-statistics and F-statistics are based on robust standard errors. *, **, and *** represent two-tailed p-values 
less than 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.  
43 
TABLE 7: OPACITY AND BANK FAILURES 
 
  Dep Var: Fail Fail Fail Fail Fail 
VARIABLES Pred Sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DELR - -1.311* -1.263* -0.757 -0.902 -0.805 
    (-1.94) (-1.83) (-0.94) (-0.68) (-0.67) 
High BorrowLend ?     -0.006     
        (-0.02)     
DELR * High BorrowLend -     -2.606*     
        (-1.93)     
High Size ?       -0.179   
          (-0.56)   
DELR * High Size -       -0.492   
          (-0.32)   
High Uninsured ?         -0.530** 
            (-2.25) 
DELR * High Uninsured -         -0.863 
            (-0.59) 
DELR + DELR*Sorting Variable -     -3.363*** -1.394* -1.668** 
Tier 1 Ratio & NPL Included?   YES YES YES YES YES 
Other Controls Included?   YES YES YES YES YES 
Regulator Effects Included?   NO YES YES YES YES 
Region Effects Included?   NO YES YES YES YES 
Observations   26,510 26,510 26,510 26,510 26,472 
Pseudo R-squared   0.637 0.642 0.643 0.643 0.643 
This table contains the estimation of equations 4, 5, and 6 using logistic regression. The dependent variable is Fail, 
which is an indicator variable equal to one if the bank failed in the next year, and zero otherwise. The primary 
independent variable is DELR, which is the incremental adjusted R-squared from including the current and future 
change in the non-performing loans ratio in the loan loss provision model in Beatty and Liao (2011) and Bushman 
and Williams (2012) multiplied by negative one. All other variables are defined in the appendix. Z-statistics and chi-
squared statistics are based on robust standard errors. *, **, and *** represent two-tailed p-values less than 0.10, 
0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
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TABLE 8: CHANGES IN OPACITY AND FIXED EFFECTS 
 
Panel A: ΔDELR on Forbear 
 
Panel B: Full First Differences 
  Dep Var: Forbear     Dep Var: ΔForbear 
VARIABLES Pred Sign (1)   VARIABLES Pred Sign (1) 
ΔDELR + 0.485**   ΔDELR + 0.551** 
    (2.12)       (2.01) 
Controls Included?   YES   Controls Included?   YES 
Regulator Effects Included?   YES   Regulator Effects Included?   YES 
Region Effects Included?   YES   Region Effects Included?   YES 
Observations   25,536   Observations   19,075 
Adjusted R-squared   0.152   Adjusted R-squared   0.095 
 
 
Panel C: ΔDELR on Fail 
 
Panel D: Bank Fixed Effects 
  Dep Var: Fail     Dep Var: Forbear 
VARIABLES Pred Sign (1)   VARIABLES Pred Sign (1) 
ΔDELR - -0.982*   DELR + 0.495** 
    (-1.74)       (2.32) 
Controls Included?   YES   Controls Included?   YES 
Regulator Effects Included?   YES   Bank Effects Included?   YES 
Region Effects Included?   YES   
   Observations   25,536   Observations   26,510 
Pseudo R-squared   0.645   Adjusted R-squared   0.137 
This table contains the estimation of modified versions of equation 4 using OLS regression in panels A, B, and D, 
and using logistic regression in panel C. Panels A and C employ a first differenced version of DELR (ΔDELR) and 
other variables in levels, panel B employs a fully first differenced specification, and panel D employs fixed effects 
regression (fixed effects are by bank). The dependent variable in panels A and D is Forbear, which is the predicted 
probability from a regression of Fail on Tier 1 Ratio and NPL for non-failed banks, and zero for failed banks. The 
dependent variable in panel B is ΔForbear, which is the first differenced version of Forbear. The dependent variable 
in panel C is Fail, which is an indicator variable equal to one if the bank failed in the next year, and zero otherwise. 
The primary independent variable in panel D is DELR, which is the incremental adjusted R-squared from including 
the current and future change in the non-performing loans ratio in the loan loss provision model in Beatty and Liao 
(2011) and Bushman and Williams (2012) multiplied by negative one. The primary independent variable in panels 
A, B, and C is ΔDELR, which is the first differenced version of DELR. All other variables are defined in the 
appendix. t-statistics and Z-statistics are based on robust standard errors. *, **, and *** represent two-tailed p-
values less than 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
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TABLE 9: PRE-CRISIS OPACITY 
 
Panel A: Forbearance 
  Dep Var: Forbear Forbear Forbear Forbear 
VARIABLES Pred Sign (1) (2) (3) (4) 
DELR + 0.372 0.362     
    (1.51) (1.47)     
High DELR +     0.141** 0.138** 
        (2.44) (2.41) 
Controls Included?   YES YES YES YES 
Regulator Effects Included?   NO YES NO YES 
Region Effects Included?   NO YES NO YES 
Observations   6,666 6,666 6,666 6,666 
Adjusted R-squared   0.294 0.302 0.295 0.302 
 
 
Panel B: Bank failure 
  Dep Var: Fail Fail Fail Fail 
VARIABLES Pred Sign (1) (2) (3) (4) 
DELR - -1.655*** -1.565***     
    (-2.72) (-2.58)     
High DELR -     -0.402*** -0.370** 
        (-2.74) (-2.49) 
Controls Included?   YES YES YES YES 
Regulator Effects Included?   NO YES NO YES 
Region Effects Included?   NO YES NO YES 
Observations   6,666 6,666 6,666 6,666 
Pseudo R-squared   0.226 0.247 0.226 0.246 
This table contains the estimation of a cross-sectional version of equation 4 using OLS regression in panel A and 
logistic regression in panel B. The dependent variable in panel A is Forbear, which is the predicted probability from 
a regression of Fail on Tier 1 Ratio and NPL for non-failed banks, and zero for failed banks. The dependent variable 
in panel B is Fail, which is an indicator variable equal to one if the bank failed in the next year, and zero otherwise. 
The first primary independent variable is DELR, which is the incremental adjusted R-squared from including the 
current and future change in the non-performing loans ratio in the loan loss provision model in Beatty and Liao 
(2011) and Bushman and Williams (2012) multiplied by negative one. The second primary independent variable is 
High DELR, which is an indicator variable equal to one if DELR is greater than or equal to zero, and zero otherwise. 
All other variables are defined in the appendix. All dependent variables are measured during the crisis, and all 
independent variables are measured as of year-end 2006. t-statistics and Z-statistics are based on robust standard 
errors. *, **, and *** represent two-tailed p-values less than 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
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TABLE 10: INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES 
 
Panel A: First stage results 
  Dep Var: DELR 
VARIABLES Pred Sign (1) 
Lagged NPL Volatility - -0.483*** 
    (-3.72) 
Data Processing Fees - -0.010*** 
    (-2.61) 
Size   -0.005*** 
    (-5.13) 
Loans   -0.008 
    (-1.04) 
ROA   -0.014 
    (-0.33) 
ROA Volatility   1.817*** 
    (5.90) 
Liquidity   -0.053*** 
    (-3.45) 
Asset Risk   -0.003 
    (-0.33) 
Loan Loss Reserve   0.125 
    (0.91) 
Loan Loss Provision   -0.961*** 
    (-8.23) 
Real Estate Loans   -0.035** 
    (-2.51) 
Consumer Loans   -0.009 
    (-0.48) 
Agriculture Loans   -0.029* 
    (-1.78) 
Commercial Loans   -0.014 
    (-0.82) 
Regulator Effects Included?   YES 
Region Effects Included?   YES 
Observations   26,506 
Adjusted R-squared   0.013 
Partial R-squared 0.1%   
Partial F-statistic 10.683*** (p < 0.001) 
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TABLE 10: INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES (CONTINUED) 
 
Panel B: Second stage results 
  Dep Var: Forbear 
VARIABLES Pred Sign (1) 
DELR (Fitted Value) + 27.832*** 
    (2.94) 
Controls Included?   YES 
Regulator Effects Included?   YES 
Region Effects Included?   YES 
Observations   26,506 
      
Overidentification test 2.447 (p = 0.12) 
Hausman test 14.566*** (p < 0.001) 
This table contains the estimation of a two-stage least squares regression using instrumental variables. Panel A 
contains the first stage regression estimating DELR as a function of two instruments and the control variables. DELR 
is the incremental adjusted R-squared from including the current and future change in the non-performing loans ratio 
in the loan loss provision model in Beatty and Liao (2011) and Bushman and Williams (2012) multiplied by 
negative one. The two instruments are Lagged NPL Volatility, which is the standard deviation of the non-performing 
loans ratio over 20 quarters from year t-3 to t-7, and Data Processing Fees, which is the natural logarithm of the 
average quarterly data processing fees in year t. Panel B presents the second stage results estimating Forbear as a 
function of the fitted value of DELR. Forbear is the predicted probability from a regression of Fail on Tier 1 Ratio 
and NPL for non-failed banks, and zero for failed banks. All other variables are defined in the appendix. Statistical 
inferences are based on robust standard errors. *, **, and *** represent two-tailed p-values less than 0.10, 0.05, and 
0.01, respectively. 
 
  
48 
TABLE 11: ALTERNATIVE OPACITY MEASURE 
 
 
Panel A: Forbearance 
  Dep Var: Forbear Forbear 
VARIABLES Pred Sign (1) (2) 
Smoothing + 0.257*** 0.247*** 
    (3.26) (3.12) 
Controls Included?   YES YES 
Regulator Effects Included?   NO YES 
Region Effects Included?   NO YES 
Observations   26,510 26,510 
Adjusted R-squared   0.152 0.153 
 
 
Panel B: Bank failure 
  Dep Var: Fail Fail 
VARIABLES Pred Sign (1) (2) 
Smoothing - -0.848** -0.799** 
    (-2.22) (-2.05) 
Controls Included?   YES YES 
Regulator Effects Included?   NO YES 
Region Effects Included?   NO YES 
Observations   26,510 26,510 
Pseudo R-squared   0.638 0.643 
This table contains the estimation of equation 4 using OLS regression in panel A and logistic regression in panel B. 
The dependent variable in panel A is Forbear, which is the predicted probability from a regression of Fail on Tier 1 
Ratio and NPL for non-failed banks, and zero for failed banks. The dependent variable in panel B is Fail, which is 
an indicator variable equal to one if the bank failed in the next year, and zero otherwise. The primary independent 
variable is Smoothing, which is the incremental adjusted R-squared from including earnings before loan loss 
provision in the loan loss provision model in Beatty and Liao (2011) and Bushman and Williams (2012). All other 
variables are defined in the appendix. t-statistics and Z-statistics are based on robust standard errors. *, **, and *** 
represent two-tailed p-values less than 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
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APPENDIX: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
Opacity Variables Descriptions 
DELR 
Incremental adjusted R-squared from including the current and future 
change in the non-performing loans ratio in the loan loss provision model 
in Beatty and Liao (2011) and Bushman and Williams (2012) multiplied by 
negative one, calculated using prior 20 quarters (min. 12) 
High DELR 
Indicator equal to one if DELR is greater than or equal to zero, and zero 
otherwise 
Smoothing 
Incremental adjusted R-squared from including earnings before the loan 
loss provision in the loan loss provision model in Beatty and Liao (2011) 
and Bushman and Williams (2012), calculated using prior 20 quarters (min. 
12) 
    
Other Variables Descriptions 
Fail Indicator equal to one if the bank failed in the next year, and zero otherwise 
Forbear 
Predicted probability (measured as a percentage) from a regression of Fail 
on Tier 1 Ratio and NPL for non-failed banks, and zero for failed banks 
Tier 1 Ratio Tier 1 capital ratio 
NPL Non-performing loans scaled by total loans 
Size Natural logarithm of assets 
Loans Total loans scaled by total assets 
ROA Annual net income scaled by beginning total assets 
ROA Volatility 
Standard deviation of quarterly return on assets (net income scaled by total 
assets) over prior 12 quarters 
Liquidity Cash scaled by total deposits 
Asset Risk Assets with 100% risk weight scaled by all risk-weighted assets 
Loan Loss Reserve Loan loss reserve scaled by total loans 
Loan Loss Provision Loan loss provision scaled by total loans 
Real Estate Loans Real estate loans scaled by total loans 
Consumer Loans Consumer loans scaled by total loans 
Agriculture Loans Agriculture loans scaled by total loans 
Commercial Loans Commercial loans scaled by total loans 
High BorrowLend 
Indicator equal to one if bank has both repurchase agreements (scaled by 
assets) above the median of all banks and reselling agreements (scaled by 
assets) above the median of all banks, and zero otherwise 
High Size 
Indicator equal to one if bank has total assets above the sample median, and 
zero otherwise 
High Uninsured 
Indicator equal to one if bank has a ratio of uninsured deposits to total 
deposits at year-end 2005 above the sample median, and zero otherwise 
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